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ABBOTT, AIDS, AND THE ADA: WHY A PER SE
DISABILITY RULE FOR HIV/AIDS IS BOTH JUST AND A MUST
SCOTT THOMPSON*

I. INTRODUCTION
It has become standard form, indeed borderline cliché, to open discussions
1
regarding the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) with the words of
2
President George H.W. Bush as he signed the legislation into law. To hedge
against the risk of being too iconoclastic—contrary to what ensues—this
commentary will follow suit:
[The ADA] signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of
persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life. As the
Declaration of Independence has been a beacon for people all over the world
seeking freedom, it is my hope that the Americans with Disabilities Act will
likewise come to be a model for the choices and opportunities of future
3
generations around the world.

However, as the number of individuals with HIV around the globe
4
continues to grow, one inescapable truth continues to dim the brightness of the
ADA’s domestic and international impact: namely, the ADA, as enforced by
American courts, has never adequately protected HIV positive individuals from
unjustified discrimination and exclusion from mainstream American life.
American courts have formed barriers to protection for HIV positive
individuals, contrary to the plain meaning and legislative intent of the statute.
The main barrier has been a shrinking definition of who is disabled.
Specifically, despite initially being hailed by some as advancing the rights of
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1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2007).
2. See Teresa A. Schneider, Note, Stretching the Limits of the ADA: Asymptomatic HIV-Positive
Status as a Disability in Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 77 NEB. L. REV. 206, 206 (1998); Ann
Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 997, 997 (2004); Christopher E.
Tierney, Comment, Casey Martin, Ford Olinger and the Struggle to Define the Limits of the Americans with
Disabilities Act in Professional Golf, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 335, 335 (2001); Karen M. Volkman, Comment,
The Limits of Coverage: Do Insurance Policies Obtained through an Employer and Administered by Insurance
Companies Fall Within the Scope of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 249,
249 (1999).
3. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602.
4. UNAIDS, Report on the global AIDS Epidemic: Executive Summary, A UNAIDS 10th
anniversary special edition at 6 (2006), available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/
2006/2006_GR-ExecutiveSummary_ en.pdf.
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people with HIV/AIDS under the ADA, the Bragdon v. Abbott decision by the
Supreme Court did not go far enough. In favor of people with HIV/AIDS, the
Court did rule that HIV, even when asymptomatic, constitutes an impairment
6
under the ADA. The Court also held that reproduction was a major life activity
7
that HIV substantially limited. However, perhaps because it was endeavoring
to walk too fine a line between providing protection and appeasing the strict
textualists, the Kennedy majority opinion did not determine that HIV/AIDS
was a per se disability under the ADA. As a consequence, Bragdon left open a
fair amount of latitude for courts to determine whether a major life activity was
being limited and, thus, a fair amount of latitude on whether a person was
disabled. Not missing a beat, courts have taken advantage of that latitude to
continually shrink the definition of “disabled” and the scope of the ADA’s
8
application. This note argues that the only way to adequately ensure that all
people with HIV/AIDS are adequately protected from discrimination is for the
courts to rule, or Congress to clarify, that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability under
the Americans with Disabilities Act—as it was intended to be.
Part II of this note will provide a primer on the ADA and its requirements
with respect to the definition of “disabled.” Part III will discuss the Bragdon
decision, its advances, and its shortcomings. Part IV, the crux of the argument,
will address how a per se disability interpretation of the ADA is more consistent
with the plain language, legislative history, administrative regulations, and
prior legal history of the ADA. Part V argues that a per se disability
interpretation makes the most sense from a policy perspective, a practical
perspective, and provides built-in checks to prevent a per se disability
interpretation from allowing a flood of frivolous litigation.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
As indicated by President Bush’s prophetic language, the ADA was
intended to usher in dramatic societal change aimed at enabling the
9
achievement of economic autonomy and social equality for the disabled.
Congress’ own sentiments regarding the purpose and the importance of the Act
10
are no less charged. Invoking the “sweep of its congressional authority,”
Congress states that the purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
11
individuals with disabilities.” Specifically, the ADA prohibits discrimination
against individuals with disabilities by employers (Title I), public entities (Title
II), and places of public accommodation (Title III).

5. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
6. Id. at 637.
7. Id. at 641.
8. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999) (holding that an
impairment that can be treated by medication or technology does not constitute a disability); see also,
infra at pp. 9–11.
9. Bush supra note 3.
10. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2007).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
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The definition of who is disabled is the same for all three provisions.
According to the definitions section of the ADA, “[t]he term “disability” means,
with respect to an individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B)
a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
12
impairment.” Hence, to be considered disabled under the Act and thus able to
access its protections, a person must satisfy three criteria with respect to
subsection (A). They must (1) have an impairment (2) that substantially limits
(3) a major life activity.
However, nowhere does Congress define what constitutes a major life
activity—the third element. That said, much can be gleaned regarding its
13
intended scope from the ADA’s precursor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and
the ADA’s implementing regulations. The Rehabilitation Act’s regulations give
a non-exhaustive, yet broad, list of examples of major life activities which
include “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks,
14
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” This is
significant because Congress, knowing that its Rehabilitation Act had been
implemented and interpreted as such by the agencies charged with its
enforcement, used the same defining language in both the Rehabilitation Act
15
and the ADA.
This repetition is important because it demonstrates the
sanctioning of the broad interpretation and implementation by the pre-ADA
16
implementing agencies. Additionally, the ADA regulations enacted by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Department of
17
Justice (“DOJ”) adopt the same non-exhaustive list of major life activities.
Indeed, motivated by a desire to ensure that the Rehabilitation Act and its
accompanying regulations and jurisprudence were not chipped away at by the
courts, Congress specifically commanded the courts not to apply a lower
18
standard than was applied under the Rehabilitation Act.
Further, as will be outlined more fully in part IV, it seems fairly evident
both from the legislative history and the Rehabilitation Act case law that
19
HIV/AIDS was intended to be considered as a disability across the board.
However, in Bragdon and even more so in the cases that have followed,
American courts have turned a blind eye to the relatively clear instruction from

12. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 790 (repealed 1992).
14. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2007): 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (2007).
15. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]: H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at
50 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE LABOR REPORT]: H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990) [hereinafter
HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT].
16. See Donald H.J. Hermann, The Developments of AIDS Federal Civil Rights Law: AntiDiscrimination Law Protection of Persons Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 33 IND. L. REV.
783, 854 (2000) (discussing the impact of incorporating the previous interpretation and the Court’s
awareness of this in the Abbott decision).
17. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2007).
18. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2007).
19. For further discussion regarding the legislative history and pre-ADA cases interpreting the
meaning of major life activity. See infra part IV.
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Congress to apply the ADA in a no less exacting, protecting fashion than the
Rehabilitation Act and to include HIV/AIDS as a disability.
III. BRAGDON V. ABBOTT, ITS ADVANCES, AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
The Supreme Court’s only decision on what constitutes a major life activity
within the context of HIV/AIDS was Bragdon v. Abbott, a Title III case in which
the dentist of an HIV positive, but asymptomatic, plaintiff, Sidney Abbott,
20
would only treat her in a hospital and if she bore the additional expenses.
Abbott brought suit under Section 12182(a) of the ADA alleging discrimination
based on her HIV status.
The main issue in contention was whether Abbott had a protected
disability. To determine this, the Court rightly looked to section 12102(2) which,
again, defines “disability” as a physical or mental impairment that substantially
21
limits a major life activity. With regard to the first element of impairment, the
Court relied heavily on the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(“HEW”) regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act which, as the Court
notes, “appear without change in the current regulations issued by the
22
Department of Health and Human Services.”
Those regulations define
“physical or mental impairment” as “(A) any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
23
genitor-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.” The Court noted
that in issuing these regulations the HEW, and later the DOJ, did not list any
specific disorders to avoid the impression that if not specifically enumerated, a
24
certain impairment was not included. Even so, the commentary accompanying
the regulations does contain a vast representative list ranging from heart disease
25
to alcoholism.
The Court, relying on these regulations as nearly dispositive of the
meaning of “impairment,” found that, from the moment of infection, HIV “must
be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant and detrimental effect
26
on the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems.” Indeed, the Court
concluded that “HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of
27
a physical impairment during every stage of the disease.” The Court did not
perform an individual inquiry regarding the physical impairment aspect of the
28
“disability” definition.
The Court did not determine whether it was an

20. 524 U.S. 624, 624 (1998).
21. Id. at 630.
22. Id. at 632.
23. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (2007).
24. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633.
25. 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (2007).
26. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. See Hermann, supra note 16, at 851 (describing the Court’s wholesale approach of treating
HIV/AIDS as a physical impairment without specifically and individually examining whether it was
an impairment to Abbott).
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impairment to Abbott, but analyzed the disease in the abstract, concluding that
if a person had the virus, regardless of the symptoms or CD4 count, there is
29
impairment. This is important because the Court recognizes, at least implicitly,
that an individualized inquiry need not be performed with respect to the
physical impairment part of the disability definition. Therefore, Bragdon
supports the conclusion that an individualized inquiry is not necessary even
though the “with respect to an individual” language of the definition applies
equally to the physical impairment prong as it does to the “major life activity”
30
prong.
Having determined that HIV infection constitutes a physical impairment
under the ADA, the Court then turned its attention to the second element of
“disability” under the ADA: whether or not a “major life activity” is being
affected. The Court noted that the plain meaning of the term “major” denoted
31
comparative importance.
Observing the breadth of the term “major life
activity,” the Court held that nothing in the definition suggests that activities
without a public, economic, or daily character were outside what constituted a
32
“major life activity.”
This holding opened the door for the Court’s
33
determination that reproduction is a “major life activity.”
After holding that reproduction was a “major life activity,” the Court
addressed the third element of the definition of disability: whether there is a
substantial limitation. Put in context, the Court answered whether having HIV
was a substantial limitation on the “major life activity” of reproduction. It did
so by analyzing medical data which suggested that an HIV-positive woman
trying to conceive imposes a significant risk of passing the infection to a man
34
and to her child, despite antiretroviral treatment. The Court also noted that
some state public health control measures forbid people with HIV from
35
engaging in intercourse with others. Because of these laws and the significant
risk of transmission to both sexual partner and fetus, the Court found that HIV
36
was a substantial limitation on reproduction, a “major life activity.”
Consequently, Abbott was “disabled” under the ADA and thus entitled to
37
protection. Unfortunately, not all HIV positive people will similarly benefit
38
from protection because the Court sidestepped the opportunity to clarify that
some impairments, particularly HIV, are per se disabilities under the ADA. By
so doing, the Court missed an opportunity to ensure that this misunderstood
disease received the full protection against discrimination envisioned by
Congress.

29. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637.
30. See id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2007).
31. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 639.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 641.
36. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 641–42 (“In view of our holding, we need not address the second question presented,
i.e., whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA.”).
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The consequences of not addressing the per se disability question are grave
and have become apparent since the Bragdon opinion. Strikingly, by basing
accessibility to the protections of the ADA on, for example, reproduction (which
39
in the eyes of many, including the dissent, was a stretch to begin with) the
Court left exposed to discrimination those who have HIV, but are no longer able
to reproduce or have no intention to reproduce. This includes post-menopausal
women, sterile men and women, and many homosexuals. Moreover, because
the Court endorses the individualized approach to determining whether a
person’s major life activity is infringed (even though they do not perform an
individualized inquiry with regard to impairment), it grants conservative courts
the leeway to construe facts so that even though a person is impaired with HIV,
a “major life activity” is not impaired.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist and others criticized the majority for not
40
doing enough of an “individualized inquiry.” To mollify these critics courts
would need to scrutinize and probe whether the particular plaintiff, in this case
Abbott, was capable of having children, wanted to have children, or was
planning on having children with seemingly no limit to how far the court can
delve. Thankfully, the majority opted for a more benign and less intrusive
implementation of the “individualized inquiry” into whether there is a
substantial limitation on a “major life activity.” Nevertheless the Court used a
model, that without checks, can be just as malleable and soul-searching as the
standard called for by the dissent. To be specific, the Bragdon decision
examined whether HIV is a substantial limitation to reproduction for a straight
female and, to a certain extent, inquired into the personal, individual effect that
41
HIV had on Abbott’s life. The effect being that HIV/AIDS deterred her from
42
reproducing. However, by never spelling out how deep the individual inquiry
is to go—and by condoning the practice with regard to people with
HIV/AIDS—the Court gave another avenue for courts to limit the protected
class through judicial interpretation.
It did not take long for courts to take advantage of the vagaries and
unanswered questions of Bragdon. Indeed, in the very next term, the Court
addressed the meaning of major life activity, albeit this time not in the context of
HIV/AIDS. In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. the Court, relying on the present
indicative tense of the statute, held that an individual must be “presently—not
potentially or hypothetically—substantially limited in order to demonstrate a
43
disability.” The Court used this finding to buttress its ultimate decision: if a
disability can be corrected through medication or technology, then it does not
44
impair a “major life activity.” This is bad news for people with HIV who,

39. See Laing P. Akers, The Wrong Standard, the Right Decision: Opening Pandora’s Box in Bragdon
v. Abbott, 28 CAP. U.L. REV. 421, 440–48 (2000) (arguing that reproduction should not be regarded as a
major life activity because it is not repeatedly performed or crucial to daily existence).
40. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657.
41. Id. at 641.
42. Id.
43. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
44. Id. at 482. See also Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Symposium: The Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Ten-Year Retrospective: The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark
Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 326 (2000) (discussing the Sutton decision but highlighting how the House
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though per se impaired under Bragdon, can be treated with antiretrovirals and,
thus, are deemed to not have major life activities affected. As science and drugs
improve (as they already have since the time of Bragdon) it is not hard to
envision courts finding, on a factual basis, that reproduction is not impaired by
HIV. Thus, on its face, the Sutton decision hinges the protection granted to HIV
positive individuals on some future court’s opinion of whether prevailing
medicine “corrects” an HIV positive individual’s ability to reproduce. Put
differently, an HIV positive individual can expect her rights to be ever-changing
and fleeting.
Moreover, the Court took the opportunity in Sutton to resolve what
ambiguity had existed post-Bragdon and specifically held that an individualized
45
inquiry must be conducted —subjecting each individual to an vast amount of
scrutiny and subjecting the courts to an incredible amount of work and
resources in adjudicating discrimination claims under the ADA.
Sutton also conflicts with both the legislative history and EEOC
46
regulations. Both the House Judiciary Report and the House Labor Report on
the ADA indicate that whether or not a person is disabled should be decided by
47
evaluating him or her absent mitigating measures.
As one commentator
phrased it, “a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in the major
life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected through the use of
48
a hearing aid.” While it seems obvious that the hearing-impaired are deaf
regardless of whether an aid helps and should be afforded protection and
accommodations for their infirmity, the same logic is no less applicable within
the context of HIV/AIDS.
The judicial shrinking of the definition of “disability” continued in Murphy
49
v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (decided contemporaneously with Sutton) where
the Tenth Circuit and then the Supreme Court again took a chunk out of what
constituted a “major life activity” and, consequently, the size of the protected
50
class. The Court held that the plaintiff, who was dismissed from his job due to
his hypertension, was not, in fact, disabled because while taking medication he
51
was not limited in the tasks he could perform. A safeguard to horrible ironies
such as this are the “regarded as” provisions within the definition of who is
disabled. However, here, as in Sutton, the Court held that the employer had
merely regarded him as unable to perform a particular job and that for work to

Judiciary Report on the ADA stated that when determining whether a disability existed, mitigating
measures should not be considered).
45. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
46. Tucker, supra note 44, at 328–29. (discussing the conflict between the Sutton decision, on one
hand, and the legislative history and regulations, on the other, which both said not to consider
mitigating measures).
47. HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT at pt. 3, at 28–29; HOUSE LABOR REPORT at pt. 2, at 52.
48. TUCKER, supra note 44, at 325.
49. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
50. For more information and further detailed explanations of both the Sutton and Murphy
decisions see Tucker, supra note 44, at 327–33.
51. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
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be a “major life activity,” the plaintiff had to be unable or regarded as unable to
52
perform a broad range of jobs.
Some have argued that despite the shrinking definition of “major life
activity,” the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability provides
53
another avenue of protection. However, courts have been very restrictive here
as well. For example, in Roberts v. Unidynamics Corp, the Eighth Circuit
determined that remarks by co-workers that the plaintiff might have AIDS were
54
insufficient to demonstrate that the company regarded him as having AIDS.
Moreover, the court held that even if the plaintiff demonstrated that the
employer regarded him as having AIDS, his burden was to demonstrate that the
employer regarded him as having a substantial impairment of a “major life
55
activity” and discriminated against him for this reason. However, in most
cases the discrimination has little or nothing to do with some “major life
activity” such as reproduction or the inability of a person with AIDS to perform
some employment task but rather arises out of fear or misunderstanding
surrounding the disease. Hence, proving that the employer regards the plaintiff
as substantially impaired in a “major life activity” is difficult, if not impossible,
thus severely undercutting the scope of who is covered and the statute’s
purpose.
Though the Court in Bragdon ruled that HIV/AIDS is a per se impairment,
indicated a willingness to interpret “major life activity” in a more expansive
way, and did some heavy lifting in interpreting reproduction as a “major life
activity,” by not ruling that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability the Court left open
an avenue to narrow what constitutes a disability under the ADA.
Unfortunately, too many courts, including the Supreme Court, have gone down
that avenue and have hampered an individual’s freedom from discrimination.
Now that Bragdon and its progeny’s shortcomings have been elucidated, it
is necessary to outline the legal soundness and benefits of a per se disability
ruling for HIV/AIDS.
IV. THE LEGAL SOUNDNESS OF A PER SE DISABILITY RULING
A. Plain Language
One of the main tools used to limit the ADA’s application is to rely, almost
exclusively, on the plain meaning of the text, ignoring legislative history,
precedent, administrative regulations, and other tools of construction. The
words of the statute are of primary importance but they do not exist in isolation.
As Tony Maida describes it, “[i]n the age of ‘new textualism’ . . . the question of
the plaintiff’s inclusion in the ADA’s conditional protected class has increasingly
56
become a convenient vehicle for courts to dispose of ADA cases.” While the

52. Id. at 524. See also Tucker, supra note 44, at 322.
53. Akers, supra note 39, at 446.
54. 126 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir.) (1997).
55. Id. at 1092.
56. Tony Maida, Note and Comments, How Judicial Myopia is Jeopardizing the Protection of People
with HIV/AIDS under the ADA, 27 AM. J.L. AND MED. 301, 305–06 (2001).
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following sections focus on how the text, in conjunction with the legislative
history, regulations, and previous case law, demonstrate that HIV/AIDS was
intended to be a per se disability, this section argues that the plain text in-andof-itself also indicates that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability.
The main textual argument supporting the idea that HIV/AIDS is not a per
se disability is that the definition of “disability” includes “with respect to an
57
individual.” While those words could certainly be read to mean that each
individual needs to be examined, it is far from self-evident. Moreover, other
sections of the ADA text explicitly mention a “class of individuals with
58
disabilities.” If “with respect to an individual” is to be fairly interpreted as
requiring an individualized inquiry into one’s disability status, then no less fair
is the conclusion that by referring to classes of individuals with disabilities the
text contemplates that there exist impairments which are, by definition, always
disabilities. Thus, people with these disabilities “can be identified and treated as
59
a class.”
Certain impairments can and should be treated as a class when the effects
60
are predictable and universally limiting. Such disabilities include blindness,
quadriplegia, and HIV infection. No one would question whether a person
paralyzed from the neck down is substantially limited in a major life activity—a
step by step, individualized inquiry is superfluous and it is borderline insulting
to scrutinize and question a person whose life has been so devastated. The same
is true when questioning the impact that HIV/AIDS has on a person’s life. As
the Court in Bragdon noted, the disease begins to damage immediately and
severely:
[I]nfection with HIV causes immediate abnormalities in a person’s blood, and
the infected person’s white cell count continues to drop throughout the course
of the disease . . . HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder
with a constant and detrimental effect on the infected person’s hemic and
61
lymphatic systems from the moment of infection.

It is this constant attack that leads almost inevitably to the HIV victim’s
death. Moreover, the Court in Bragdon found that the text of the statute did not
mandate an individualized inquiry with respect to the physical impairment
prong of disability, not withstanding the “with respect to an individual”
62
language. Hence, Bragdon, despite its shortcomings, could be seen as important
in interpreting the plain meaning of “with respect to an individual” expansively.
In line with the textual interpretation of HIV as a per se disability is the
purpose of the Act, which is part of the text and should not be ignored even
from a textualist approach. However, even if the purpose was not specifically
enumerated by Congress, courts should look to Congress’ purpose to resolve

57. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2007).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
59. Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 29, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (No. 97—156)
[Hereinafter Brief].
60. Id. at 28.
61. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998).
62. See id. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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any questions regarding the plain meaning of the statute in alignment with that
63
purpose. If it is not clear from the text that certain classes of impairments are
per se disabilities, then an ambiguity exists in the text and the purpose must be
evaluated. Again, because Congress codified its purpose, that purpose should
be evaluated regardless of ambiguity in the text.
Congress’ stated purpose is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
64
disabilities” and a “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
65
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
It is hard to imagine
grander, clearer language; the purpose of this Act was to eliminate
discrimination against people who had been historically disadvantaged and
discriminated against. People with HIV/AIDS, especially in the decade
preceding the enactment of the ADA, have suffered such discrimination—
perhaps more than any other group.
In conjunction with the articulated purpose of the statute, the plain
meaning should be evaluated in light of the statute’s remedial nature. It is
standard statutory interpretation that remedial legislation, such as the ADA,
should be interpreted broadly to effectuate Congress’ intention of prohibiting
66
discrimination.
That broad interpretive gloss dictates that the conflicting
references to individuals and classes of individuals be read to afford as much
protection as possible. The reading that affords the most protection includes
HIV/AIDS as a per se disability.
B. Legislative History
Any remaining doubt regarding Congress’ statutory intent to include some
classes of disabilities as per se disabilities is easily overcome by the voluminous
legislative history. Legislative history is valuable when the statutory language is
not clear on its face. However, even when “the language of the statute is clear,
any lingering doubt as to its proper construction may be resolved by examining
67
the legislative history.” The legislative history of the ADA evinces a clear
intent and understanding that all individuals with HIV/AIDS, as a class, are
disabled under the ADA.
Both the Senate and the House of Representative considered HIV infection
68
and AIDS as disabilities under the ADA, without delving into individualized
examinations. Both Senate and House reports accepted and concurred with the
DOJ’s conclusion that “a person infected with [HIV] is covered under the first
prong of the definition of the term disability because of a substantial limitation
69
to procreation and intimate sexual relations.”

63. Edwards v. Valdez, 789 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1986).
64. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2007).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
66. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1996).
67. United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 561 (1982).
68. Maida, supra note 56, at 306 (pointing out that both the House and Senate reports considered
HIV as a disability and even went so far as including it in its list of representative disorders).
69. HOUSE LABOR REPORT at pt. 2, at 52; SENATE REPORT at 22; see Memorandum from Douglas
W. Kamiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to
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Moreover, related both to the ADA’s purpose and the legislative history is
Congress’ belief that ending discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS is a
crucial element in the public health strategy for combating the spread of the
70
disease. The former Chairperson of the President’s Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, Admiral Watkins, pressed Congress to enact
a strong national policy aimed at preventing discrimination. Admiral Watkins
testified that “discrimination against individuals with HIV infection is
widespread and has serious repercussions for both the individual who
71
experiences it and this Nation’s efforts to control the epidemic.”
Both
72
chambers included this testimony in their reports.
ADA protection for
individuals with HIV/AIDS is crucial to stopping the spread of the disease
because discrimination pushes the disease underground, perpetuates stigma
associated with the disease and, as a consequence, prevents people from getting
73
tested and treated. The House, agreeing with the Commission, believed that
the ADA was necessary to ensure that “all persons with symptomatic and
asymptomatic HIV infection [would] be clearly included as persons with
74
disabilities.” This is unequivocal language indicating that all people with HIV
are disabled.
The congressional record is replete with statements by representatives
indicating that HIV/AIDS is a “disability” under the ADA. This sentiment was
so widespread it seems as if it was almost taken for granted. One example is the
statement of Congressman McDermott who said that people with HIV are
“covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the ADA . . . . As
a physician, I know that although the major life activity that is affected at any
point along the spectrum by the HIV infection may be different, an effect on
75
some major life activity exists from the time of HIV infection.” Indeed, even
the ADA’s most vociferous detractors, such as Senator Helms, recognized that
76
people with HIV are a protected class under the ADA. That is probably one of
the reasons he opposed the bill.
Critics of the per se disability position highlight that the ADA drafters
rejected a proposal to treat disability as a category of protected people similar to
the protected classes of Title VII: gender, race, national origin, and religion.
However, that decision was driven “by political considerations and a calculated
Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President (Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in Hearings on S. 933,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1989). See also HERMANN, supra note 16,
at 797 (discussing the importance of the House and Senate reports and their acceptance of the DOJ
report); MAIDA, supra note 56, at 306 (also discussing the importance of the House and Senate reports
and their acceptance of the DOJ report).
70. See Maida, supra note 56, at 306–07.
71. SENATE REPORT at 8; HOUSE LABOR REPORT at pt. 2, at 31. See also MAIDA, supra note 56, at
307.
72. Id.
73. Maida, supra note 56, at 306–07.
74. HOUSE LABOR REPORT at pt. 2, at 31. See also Hermann, supra note 16, at 787.
75. 136 CONG. REC. H2626 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. McDermott). See Wendy
E. Parmet and Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the New Social Construction of
HIV, 23 AM. J. L. AND MED. 7, 21 (1997).
76. 135 CONG. REC. S10, 765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
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legal judgment that, based on Rehabilitation Act precedent, this definition was
77
functionally equivalent to Title VII.”
One commentator has summarized the legislative history of HIV under the
ADA succinctly, stating:
While all of the Congressional legislative reports on the ADA that considered
the question of whether HIV infection is a disability under the ADA reached the
same conclusion that it is . . . none of the reports actually proceeded through a
step-by-step analysis under the actual terms of the statute to show how AIDS
and HIV infection met the statutory criteria for disability. Instead, these reports
simply assume that the impairment caused by HIV is a significant physical
78
impairment and that persons with HIV are assumed to have a disability.

Hence, Congress clearly believed that HIV was a per se disability and did not
find it necessary to undergo a step-by-step analysis to do so.
C. Administrative Regulations
Congress’ inclusion of those with HIV as per se disabled, and thus
protected under the ADA, is also found in the administrative regulations. The
statute specifically authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate regulations
79
implementing Title III of the ADA. Because of this congressional authorization
the regulations carry significant weight and are not to be ignored as recent
80
decisions have done.
The regulations should be given additional gravitas
when one considers that the statute is far from definitive in indicating that an
individual inquiry must be conducted.
Consistent with the House and Senate Reports that adopted the DOJ
Memorandum, which declared that asymptomatic HIV individuals are disabled
because HIV substantially limits the major life activities of reproduction and
intimate sexual relations, is the definitions section of the DOJ regulations which
81
adopts the same language. The agency charged with implementing regulations
82
for Title I of the Act, the EEOC, adopts even more uncompromising language.
The EEOC regulations explain how in most cases “[t]he determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or
diagnosis of the impairment the person has . . . . Some impairments may be
83
disabling for particular individuals but not for others.”
The regulations
continue, stating “[o]ther impairments, however, such as HIV infection, are

77. Maida, supra note 56, at 305. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
91, 91–93, 126–29 (2000).
78. Hermann, supra note 16, at 813.
79. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2007) (“Not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted July 26, 1990], the Attorney General shall issue
regulations in an accessible format to carry out the provisions of this title [42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq] “)
80. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999).
81. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. B Section 36.104 (2007).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (“Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act [enacted July
26, 1990], the Commission shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this title”)
83. 29 C.F.R. 1630 App. (2007).
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84

inherently substantially limiting.” HIV is the example that the regulations
point to as undoubtedly being substantially limiting. The Technical Assistance
Manual on Title I echoes this by describing how “[s]ome impairments, such as
blindness, deafness, HIV infection or AIDS, are by their nature substantially
85
limiting.” To complete the enthymeme: HIV is thus, by its nature, a disability.
Bragdon recognized the validity of both the pre- and post-ADA regulations.
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Court’s “holding is confirmed by a
consistent course of agency interpretation before and after the enactment of the
86
ADA.” The Court also condoned the adding of HIV to the representative list of
87
disorders constituting a physical impairment.
Moreover, relying on the
administrative regulations to help interpret the definition of disability in the
88
ADA is consistent with Chevron analysis. Chevron analysis, as explained by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corporation, first requires courts to
determine whether Congress intended to grant the agency the power to issue
89
regulations with the “force of law” on the subject in question. If there is such a
delegation, courts are to examine whether the statute’s meaning is clear or
90
ambiguous/silent.
If the meaning is clear then the regulations should be
consistent with the statute. If the meaning is ambiguous or silent, then courts
are to defer to the agency interpretation so long as the interpretation is
91
reasonable. If there is no delegation then the regulations are not entitled to
Chevron deference (though they may be entitled to some lower level of
92
deference).
Here, Congress’ intent to have the agencies issue regulations with the
“force of law” is made evident both by the explicit charge to the agencies to
issue regulations and by Congress’ acknowledgement of the pre-ADA
93
regulations which it approved, endorsed, and incorporated. As outlined in the
previous sections, a strong argument can be made based on the plain meaning
and legislative intent that HIV was intended to be considered a per se disability
and thus any regulation to that affect is consistent with the statute. However, at
worst, the statute is ambiguous or silent as to the meaning of disability and thus
the agency regulations should be deferred to if reasonable. Here, the regulatory
definitions are eminently reasonable especially when considered in light of the
text, legislative history, and purpose of the ADA all which support a per se
disability ruling and, more generally, are geared towards protecting individuals

84. Id.
85. EEOC, Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, at T-II (1992).
86. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998).
87. Id. at 646; 28 C.F.R. 36.104(1)(iii) (2007).
88. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Maida, supra
note 56, at n.121 (highlighting the role of Chevron analysis and how if the language is not clear, then
agencies can be empowered to fill the gap).
89. Id. at 843–44; United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
90. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–30.
91. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
92. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27
93. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b); § 12116. (2007), MAIDA, supra
note 56, at 307.
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with disabilities from the scourge of discrimination. As a result, great deference
should be given to the agency regulations.
Despite Congress’s delegation to the agencies and their recognition of that
delegation in Bragdon, the Court, just one year later in Sutton, had a change of
heart. In Sutton, the Court wrongly ignored the EEOC regulations, arguing that
because of the ADA’s structure, no agency had been delegated authority to issue
94
regulations regarding the definitions sections, 12101 and 12102. The argument
in Sutton was that Section 12116 of the ADA commands the EEOC to “issue
95
regulations [ . . . ] to carry out this subchapter.” According to the majority, the
reference to “this subchapter” confines the regulations scope to Title I, Sections
96
12111-12117. However, as Justice Breyer highlights in his dissent, the EEOC is
empowered to “elaborate through regulations the meaning of the term
‘disability’ if elaboration is needed in order to ‘carry out’ the substantive
97
provision of ‘this subchapter.’”
Also, the term “disability” is ubiquitous
throughout Title I and because the term is used in the subchapter referred to by
98
Congress, the EEOC is empowered to issue regulations to clarify its meaning.
Finally, the language “in this subchapter” was most likely added to distinguish
the EEOC’s ability to regulate employment and the DOJ’s ability to regulate
under Title III as opposed to limiting either agency’s ability to interpret the
meaning of “disability.”
In addition to the current regulations, the previous legal history of the
ADA is overwhelming in its endorsement of the interpretation of HIV as a per se
disability.
D. Prior Legal History
As described above in the Overview of the ADA, Congress, knowing how the
courts and regulations had interpreted the definition of handicap in the
99
Rehabilitation Act, used the same definition and regulations in the ADA. As
Abbott’s brief points out, “every reported decision under the Rehabilitation and
the Fair Housing Act had determined that asymptomatic HIV constituted a
100
disability.” The list of court decisions ruling that asymptomatic HIV is a per se
disability is voluminous.
In Cain v. Hyatt, the court ruled that “HIV infection constitutes a substantial
101
limitation upon major life activities.” The court in Thomas v. Atascadero Unified
School District held that “[p]ersons infected with the AIDS virus suffer

94. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999); Maida, supra note 56, at n.162.
95. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2007).
96. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478.
97. Id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See Maida, supra note 56 at n.162 (quoting and highlighting
Breyer’s recognition that the term disability is throughout the ADA and thus the EEOC would have
the authority to help define the term).
98. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at.514–15 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. See discussion supra at 4.
100. Brief, at 9–10. See Hermann, supra note 16, at 853 (also pointing out that “every agency that
addressed the problem before enactment of the ADA reached the conclusion that those with HIV
infection were handicapped”)
101. 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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In Doe v. Garrett, the
significant impairments of their major life activities.”
court noted that “it is well established that infection with AIDS constitutes a
103
handicap for the purposes of the [Rehabilitation] Act.”
Surprisingly, though
Bragdon skirted the issue of whether or not HIV/AIDS was a per se disability,
the Court also recognized that “[e]very court which addressed the issue before
the ADA was enacted in July 1990 . . . concluded that asymptomatic HIV
104
infection satisfied the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of a handicap.”
The
Court did so while citing a cache of cases even more comprehensive than the
105
one included in the Plaintiff’s brief.
This prior legal history revolving around the Rehabilitation Act is of
incredible significance given the standard canon of construction that presumes
that when Congress enacts a new law incorporating language or sections of
previous law, Congress is aware of the previous judicial interpretations and
106
adopts them as part of the new statute unless otherwise specified.
That
presumption is all the more valid here because Congress gave explicit directions
that the ADA be interpreted in alignment with such prior legal history and
dictated that no lower standards or protections be applied than those applied in
107
the Rehabilitation Act.
Indeed, the ADA was specifically drafted to
incorporate the Rehabilitation Act and its prior interpretation because
108
lawmakers were comfortable with the act and the judicial interpretations of it.
Given that the prior legal history, agency regulations, legislative history
and plain text support the idea that HIV, even when asymptomatic, is a per se
disability under the ADA, the Court should either rule as such based on the
overwhelming weight of legal evidence or Congress should clarify its intention
to include HIV/AIDS as a per se disability. However, aside from the purely
legalistic or formalistic reasons to rule that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability, there
are also policy reasons and practical benefits to the per se disability rule.
V. THE POLICY AND PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF A PER SE DISABILITY RULING
Until this point, the focus of this note has been to justify HIV/AIDS as a per
se disability from a legal perspective. Focusing on the law should not
overshadow the more fundamental reason why a per se ruling is necessary:
because of the protection it would provide. It would serve as the full
embodiment of Congress’s intent in passing the ADA, fundamentally changing
how the least amongst us are viewed.

102. 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1987); see HERMANN, supra note 16, at 807–08 (discussing the
court’s treatment of an asymptomatic HIV positive individual as per se handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act).
103. 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990).
104. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644 (1998); see Brief, at 61–62.
105. Id.
106. Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s Theatres, Inc., v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978).
107. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2007).
108. See Maida, supra note 56, at 305, Feldblum, supra note 77, at 91–93, 101–02, 126–29 (both
discussing Congress’s intent to continue the previous interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act with
the enactment of the ADA).
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Put simply, a per se disability rule protects people with HIV/AIDS from
the discrimination that has plagued the disease since before its official naming
and discovery. This protection becomes all the more important when one
considers that HIV/AIDS discrimination has often been linked with and used as
a reason for discriminating against some of societies most marginalized groups,
notably homosexuals and Haitians. Indeed, before the disease was officially
termed AIDS, it was known originally known as “GRID,” or gay-related
109
immune deficiency. Sadly and shockingly, some people still refer to it as such.
By ruling that HIV is a per se disability, the loophole that currently exists
would be closed. As discussed above, under Bragdon, a “major life activity”
must be identified, followed by an individualized inquiry into whether the
physical impairment affects the major life activity. However, with regard to the
“major life activity” of reproduction, homosexuals and people who are unable to
110
have children, may not be protected by the ADA.
This is particularly true
111
given the recent trend toward limiting what constitutes a “major life activity.”
Even though homosexuals have recently found ways to procreate,
“reproduction is generally regarded [wrongly or rightly] as a heterosexual
112
activity.” In fact, “courts and commentators alike have expressly excluded gay
113
men and lesbians from the class of people who procreate.” Indeed, the court
in Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., N.A. directly questions the role of
reproduction in the homosexual plaintiff’s life and whether or not reproduction
114
was a “major life activity” for that individual. If what constitutes a major life
activity is limited, and HIV is not regarded as a per se disability, then
homosexuals, post-menopausal women, and others will be unable to gain
protected status under a different major life activity. The result is that certain
people are not protected simply because of their age, hormones, or sexuality—
an unacceptable result.
On a practical level, a per se disability ruling saves the courts and parties
resources and time in litigation. By considering HIV/AIDS a per se disability,
courts avoid the extensive discovery and individualized inquiry that closely
scrutinizes every aspect of a plaintiff’s life and the disease’s impact on it. Courts
can devote more attention either to other cases or, within HIV-ADA cases, to the
most pressing question of whether or not the disability is the reason for the
discrimination.
Finally and briefly, some defense. One of the main concerns by critics of a
per se disability ruling is that it will lead to fluvial litigation and frivolous
115
suits. These suits run the risk of both watering down the ADA and exposing
businesses to financially debilitating liability. However, though a per se
109. Avert.org , The History of AIDS: 1981-1986, http://www.avert.org/his81_86.htm (last
visited Aug. 10, 2007).
110. Schneider, supra note 2, at 221.
111. See, e.g. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482—83; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
112. Michelle R. King & Beth S. Herr, The Consequences and Implications of a Case-by-Case Analysis
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for Asymptomatic HIV-Positive Gay Men and Lesbians PostBragdon, 8 LAW & SEX. 531, 546 (1998).
113. Id.
114. 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997).
115. Schneider, supra note 2, at 228.
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disability ruling would expand the size of the protected class, an important
check remains. To win a suit under the ADA, discrimination must occur and it
116
must be based on the disability.
Just because a person is HIV positive, i.e.
disabled, and is dismissed from her job, does not ensure that she has won her
suit. Instead, by streamlining the analysis for HIV-positive individuals, the
focus of litigation is brought back to the motivation and action of the
defendants. This rightly refocuses the discussion on protecting the disabled and
ensuring that defendants who do not mistreat the disabled out of fear or malice
are also protected. This is contrary to the current focus on forcing plaintiffs to
become martyrs and prove that they really, honestly, are disabled, and that their
lives have been substantially devastated.
There is also a very real concern that labeling people with HIV as per se
disabled would further stigmatize them given the historical negatives associated
with the term “disabled.” This is an important concern, but one that can be
somewhat mitigated. First, by including HIV positive individuals as disabled
under the ADA, they are provided legal protection against potential
stigmatization and discrimination. That protection will have downstream
affects on societal norms. Moreover, not discounting the stigma associated with
being disabled, these individuals are already battling the stigma of being HIV
positive that may be even more intense. Further, in discrimination cases such as
Bragdon, plaintiffs are arguing that, despite their condition they are in fact able
to do their jobs and that they should be given an equal and fair chance to
compete, and work, free of discrimination and stigma.
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude, HIV/AIDS should be considered a per se disability under the
ADA because it is legally sound, good public policy, and practically sensible.
The plain text, legislative history, administrative regulations, and prior legal
history all demonstrate that HIV was intended to be considered a per se
disability and HIV victims were not intended to undergo an extensive, probing,
case-by-case analysis. Also, a per se rule would ensure that people with barriers
to reproduction such as menopause, infertility, or homosexuality are not
unfairly excluded from the ADA’s protection, giving full effect to Congress’
expansive purpose. Because of the requirement that a person be actually
discriminated against because of their disability, this rule will not clog the courts
nor lead to frivolous litigation. For these reasons, the Supreme Court should
rule or Congress should clarify that HIV/AIDS is a per se disability and by
doing so help to relight the beacon that is the ADA.

116.

See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2007).

